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ABSTRACT
Industrial control system (ICS) networks and supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system networks are
less likely to be within a strict closed network environment,
which increases the likelihood of cyber-attacks. Over the
last decade, intrusion detection has become an additional
security measure for ICS and SCADA system networks to
help prevent and minimize loss that may be sustained from
cyber-attacks. ICS and SCADA network communication is
typically repetitive and deterministic, which allows normal
activity to be more easily modeled on the behavior of system
specific events. Given this deterministic behavior, an unsupervised anomaly-based intrusion detection system may provide increased performance over the more typical misuse detection method. We propose an unsupervised machine learning approach for the implementation of a network IDS in
power system applications. The approach would supplement
a more complex IDS by quantifying the degree by which an
event is an attack, given network data states, to improve
intrusion detection and minimize false alarm rates. The
clustering approach contains four key processes: data preprocessing, unsupervised learning (cluster analysis), generating features from clusters, and classifying states using the
Mamdani fuzzy inference system. Data sets from a simulated power distribution system are used to illustrate the
impact of the proposed approach.

Keywords
cluster analysis, cluster tendency, feature selection, FIS, IDS,
ICS, machine learning, SCADA, smart grid

1.

INTRODUCTION

SCADA systems are industrial control systems (ICS) that
manage the behavior of large distributed systems which exist
in critical infrastructure sections [16]. SCADA systems rely
upon confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data to ensure continuity of operations [16]. In the event of an cyberPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
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attack, incidents such as blocked information flow, unauthorized changes to commands, inaccurate transfer of information to system operators, or endangerment of human life due
to interference of safety system operations could occur [16].
In 2010, Stuxnet specifically attacked SCADA systems, resisted anti-virus detection, maintained stealth, and avoided
detection all while utilizing multiple methods to infect systems by way of network shares and thumb drives [16].
The overall model for this work involves unsupervised
learning through the use of different techniques to identify
threats in an environment where the data is not labeled or
classified. This task must be completed to ensure the systems operate as designed with no manipulation of functionality while also ensuring no disclosure of data to unauthorized individuals and continuous operation of data availability to those who are authorized [16].
As power systems increasingly depend on communication
infrastructures to provide the wide-area monitoring and control, power systems are exposed to the threat of cyberattacks. Cyber-attacks are another form of power system
contingency. Attacks that target power systems can exploit
vulnerabilities in control devices and communication links to
corrupt control and measurement signals [10][13], and compromise monitoring algorithms [23]. Cyber-attacks that corrupt control and measurement signals can be disguised as
power system disturbances or control actions. Situational
awareness technologies are needed to distinguish between
actual power system disturbances related to natural events,
and cyber-attacks.
A single classifier which identifies all types of power system contingencies is needed as an input to automated event
response algorithms such as autonomic management frameworks, system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) [18], and
wide area protection systems (WAPS) [1]. Wide area measurement systems (WAMS) couple time synchronized voltage, current, and frequency measurements with high speed
networks to allow improved power system situational awareness [9]. Compared to traditional SCADA systems that poll
field sensors once per several seconds; synchrophasor systems allow measurement of up to 120 samples per second.
However, using synchrophasor data alone is not enough to
detect cyber-attacks. Such example can be a cyber-attack
that mimics a real fault by first infecting false measurements then tripping the relay. The status of other power
system components such as relays and breakers is also available as time-synchronized data via synchrophasor systems
[2]. Combining synchrophasor data with other system logs
such as relay status logs and network event monitor logs

can extend the situational awareness capabilities provided
by a synchrophasor system to detect cyber-attacks. But,
this creates the challenge of how heterogeneous data sources
can be merged to train and use such a classifier. This paper provides a clustering approach that leverages the data to
discern its underlying structure and classify states as normal
behavior or cyber-attacks.
In this work, a pattern for a scenario is presented as a
sequence of system samples/states in temporal order. A
system state in a common path is made up of multiple instantaneous readings from available sensors from the system. Attacks may originate from a compromised node in the
control center, sending control commands or measurement
packets covered by legitimate source IP addresses and legal
packet formats. As such, it is assumed the masquerading
packets cannot be detected by traditional network intrusion
detection systems. Validation of the proposed algorithm is
based on simulated data because actual synchrophasor data
is not available for researchers due to the proprietary nature
of data, confidentiality issues, and lack of proper sharing
mechanism among researchers and institutes. Additionally,
data sets captured from utilities contain a limited number
of scenarios. This limits diversity in the data set. Some
power system scenarios are rare, especially cyber-attacks,
hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation allows targeted data
set creation realistic scenarios captured from the same commercial devices found in utilities. The same data used in
this work has also been used in [5] for synchrophasor data
mining research.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) [22] are network security appliances designed to quickly intercept attacks, potentially overlooked by security measures such as firewalls,
to protect data confidentiality, integrity, and availability by
preventing or minimizing the impact of attacks. Network intrusion detection systems typically utilize misuse detection
methods to identify normal states given historical knowledge of attacks and vulnerabilities. New attacks may be
overlooked by misuse detection methods if there is no prior
record of an attack. Anomaly detection is the opposite of
misuse detection, which identifies attacks given historical
knowledge of normal states. Supervised learning techniques
are most commonly used for anomaly detection [7]. These
techniques rely heavily on training data set(s) made up of
normal states [31]. For supervised learning anomaly detection techniques to be effective in real-world applications the
training data would need to contain an assortment of all possible normal states found within each observation and be free
of any outliers that would compromise the algorithm. Obtaining a training data set of this caliber may not be practical or necessary for each IDS application. Unsupervised
anomaly detection provides benefits over misuse detection
and supervised anomaly detection. Unsupervised methods
do not require prior knowledge of states or training data;
thus, potentially detecting new attacks without any record
of attacks or normal states. However, assumptions must be
made on the data given the clustering model to distinguish
attack states from normal states.
Rule-based methods are commonly combined with misuse detection for intrusion detection. The rules are built
on known vulnerabilities and attack vectors. The drawback
to this approach is there dependency on prior knowledge of
threats and how those threats appear on the network. To improve the detection of unknown threats statistical methods

may be supplemented. This can be accomplished by monitoring the occurrence of some specific event over time with a
choice statistical metric. If the quantity exceeds a specified
bounds then one can assume intrusion. A similar method
will be used with our approach to intrusion detection. Supplementing methods such as cluster validity and fuzzy inference system may be necessary to more easily quantify the
cluster result.
Partition-based clustering methods such as the fuzzy cmeans (FCM) algorithm [3], groups data on the assumption
that groups are tight well-separated clusters of data. Therefore, similar assumptions may be inferred to detect outliers
using this type of algorithm: 1) if anomalies (cyber-attacks)
are present, then the number of normal states greatly exceeds the number of anomalous states; 2) the anomalous
states are measurably different than normal states. These
assumptions may not always be true. For instance, if attack states greatly exceed normal states, then the algorithm
would classify cyber-attacks as normal behavior, and vice
versa. This would lead to a significant false classification
rate. Also, cyber-attacks disguised as typical power system
disturbances may not be measurably different than normal
activity, if the disturbances are common. In this case, the
second assumption would prevent the algorithm from identifying cyber-attacks. Alternatively, if the power system disturbance is uncommon, then the associated system states
may be incorrectly classified as cyber-attacks.
The proposed approach takes an alternative method by using the cluster prototypes from a data set of normal states,
similar to supervised learning, and compares the cluster prototypes from each observed sample, which is coupled with
power system logs to improve detection.
The following work presents several contributions. First,
our primary contribution, which distinguishes our work from
existing unsupervised learning IDS methods is an unsupervised machine learning approach that provides increased detection rates by minimizing the constraints associated with
typical unsupervised learning IDS. We also present a methodological approach and usage model applied to industrial power
system networks. In order to intelligently quantify the presence of cyber-attacks and relax the assumptions required to
detect anomalies using cluster analysis the FCM is combined
with the fuzzy inference system (FIS). The FCM and FIS
are the main fundamental methods utilized in the proposed
clustering approach to industrial network intrusion detection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
section 2, we present related works and their relevance to
the motivation of this work. Section 3, we describe the
proposed clustering approach and respective mathematical
models. We provide explicit results comparing the FCM
IDS, K-means IDS, and proposed IDS in Section 4. Section
5 describes electrical transmission substation protection and
concludes the paper.

2.

RELATED WORK

Various traditional data mining algorithms were used to
classify power system faults and cyber-attacks in [5]. These
algorithms were able to differentiate between three broad
categories; power system disturbance, control actions, and
cyber-attacks. Current research on applying data mining to
synchrophasor data for power system fault and disturbance
classification can be found in [25] and [8]. The K-nearest

neighbor algorithm was used to classify three phase faults,
voltage oscillation, and voltage sag scenarios in [25]. Hoefding Trees based stream data mining is used in [8]. This
approach was able to classify three phase faults and single
line to ground faults grouped for binary classification with
greater than 90 percent accuracy using simulated power system data.
In the recent past, many literary works were contributed
presenting unsupervised anomaly-based intrusion detection
methods implementing algorithms such as the K-means [19]
and FCM. As mentioned earlier, clustering anomaly detection typically identifies attack states without learning from
training data. For example, an unsupervised IDS using FKprototype clustering was presented in [29]. The system did
not perform as well as misuse and supervised anomaly detection methods applied to the same data set. This resulted
from the inability to identify attacks when attack states were
measurably similar to normal states. The authors recognized
that the drawback may have been linked to not utilizing
training data.
A network IDS using the FCM was presented in [26]. The
algorithm is applied more generally where data is classified
given abnormal or normal clusters; therefore, making the
assumption that abnormal and normal states strictly belong
to their respective clusters. This approach assumes no other
relationship exists between clusters and anomalies, and a
crisp decision is made based on an observation belonging to
a particular cluster. However it is not clear how the clusters
are labeled, and the aforementioned assumptions were used
to classify each observed state. The FCM IDS performance
was similar to the FK-prototype clustering.
The work presented [14] is a similar method using the Kmeans algorithm. Again, this algorithm was confined to the
aforementioned set of assumptions in order to detect attacks.
The K-means algorithm outperformed the FK-prototype using the same data set in [29].
The research presented in [4] combined anomaly detection
algorithm with a clustering algorithm. This technique is
used to identify anomalies related to clusters by finding the
cluster membership, multiple cluster membership, and the
degree of which each state is an anomaly. In contrast to the
work presented in [26], this approach attempts to distinguish
the relationship between anomalies and clusters.
Each algorithm successfully demonstrates the application
of unsupervised machine learning for anomaly-based intrusion detection; however, they all share a common set of
assumptions. Applying clustering with these assumptions
alone is not enough. The ideal IDS should quantify the degree of an attack or normal state regardless of whether the
feature space has more or less cyber-attack activity versus
normal activity, and should be capable of identifying cyberattacks that mimic normal behavior.

3.

METHODOLOGY

The following subsections describe the proposed unsupervised anomaly-based IDS approach (Fig. 1). The power
system data discussed in [5] was used to evaluate the proposed method. The data set is described in more detail in
the following section. We will discuss the techniques used
and analyze the proposed IDS results against the K-means
IDS, and FCM IDS.

3.1

IDS Algorithm

Table 1: Attack Scenarios Selected from the Power
System Data Set to Evaluate the Proposed IDS.
Our approach to evaluating clustering for IDS in ICS and
SCADA systems consists of four processes. 1) A pre-processing
step is applied to the data sets as an attempt to improve the
clustering efficiency and outcome. This step also includes
feature reduction and a process to estimate the number of
clusters. The subtractive clustering technique was used to
estimate the underlying number of clusters. 2) Clustering
analysis is conducted to find underlying structures present
in the data sets. 3) Features are generated from the cluster
result considering cluster intra-distances and inter-distances
and their associated elements. 4) States are classified given
the index generated by the fuzzy inference system.

3.2

Data Set Description

The power system data used in this analysis is a subset
of data sets created by Mississippi State University [5]. The
initial data set consisted of 15 sets with 37 power system
event scenarios within each data set. The different scenarios are divided into Natural Events (8), No Events (1), and
Attack Events (28). We used the power system data to generate more complex data sets (Table 1). There are multiple
types of scenarios that are found within the data sets (see
enumeration below).
1. Short-circuit fault which represents a short in a power
line that can occur in various locations along the line.
2. Line Maintenance which represents when one or more
relays that are disabled on a line requiring maintenance.
3. Remote tripping command injection which represents
an attack that results in a command being sent to a
relay which causes a breaker to open.
4. Relay setting change which represents an attack where
the attacker changes the setting of relays that are configured with a distance protection and causes the relay
function to become disabled and not trip for an actual
fault or command.
5. Data injection which represents an attack that imitates
an actual fault by changing current, voltage, sequence,
components values to parameters which ultimately result in a blackout.

Figure 1: Flow Diagram of Proposed Clustering Approach to Industrial Network Intrusion Detection

3.3

Feature Selection

Initially, the feature space was reduced by applying principal component analysis (PCA) a popular feature reduction
technique also used in [4][27]. The PCA is used to reduce the
M -dimensional feature space by projecting the data on lines
(principal components) in an N -dimensional space such that
the most variance is achieved. The principal components
(y ) follow three properties [27]: 1) E[y(i)y(j)] = 0, i 6= j,
therefore uncorrelated; 2) y1 ≥ y2 ≥, ..., ≥ yn ; and 3) the total variation in y1 , y2 , ..., yn is equal to the total variation in
the original features x1 , x2 , ..., xm . The principal components
can be found easily using eigenanalysis of the covariance
(correlation) matrix of x [15]. The eigenvectors represent
the direction of the principal components. The eigenvalues
give a measure for the amount of variance on features for
each direction. The highest eigenvalue is the first principal
component, the second highest is the second principal component, and so on. The feature space is reduced by only
using the principal components with the most significant
values.
The features below were selected from four features plus
logs shown to have the most information in prior work [5].
Only a few features out of the 128 dimension feature space
were needed to classify data in the power system data set.
These features were utilized in place of the features generated using the PCA approach to evaluate and compare the
IDS methods as it increased computational efficiency.

1. Phase A Current Phase Angle
2. Phase A Current Phase Magnitude
3. Control Logs
4. Relay Logs
5. Snort Logs

3.4

Standardize Data

The features presented in the power system data set are
within numerous ranges. Features with much larger values
or much smaller values may bias the clustering algorithm as
the features have more influence on the optimization task.
Standardizing the feature space so that the feature values
are within the same range is a way to improve clustering

Table 2: K-means, FCM, and Proposed IDS Algorithm Results for Quantization versus Normalization Comparison.
results. We used unity based normalization. The features
are normalized by calculating:
x̂n =

xn − min(x)
max(x) − min(x)

(1)

where x = (x1 , · · · , xn ) is the feature space and x̂n is the
nth normalized feature.
An additional step was added in the normalization function to better handle large variance in the distance vectors
computed as inputs to the inference system. During analysis it was noted that large variance in the distance vector
was caused by very few states having greater value than the
average vector value. Using unity based normalization was
not enough to resolve this issue alone. The problem was
mitigated by establishing a simple threshold for the upper
bound of each distance vector. We used the following piecewise function:
(
D(i) =

Pn

D(i)

Pn

, D(i)
> 2 i=1N
2 i=1N
Pn
i=1 D(i)
D(i), D(i) < 2
N

D(i)

(2)

Quantization was applied to the data sets as another alternative to reduce large variance in data facilitated by only
a few outliers. The quantized feature sets and normalized
feature sets were compared using the K-means, FCM, and
proposed IDS results. As illustrated in Table 2, the K-means
performance is reduced using normalized data versus quantized data; however, the FCM and proposed IDS perform
slightly better (overall) given the normalized results. The
quantization method was selected over the normalization
method as it is less computationally complex. The algorithms are compared using true positive (TP) detection rate,
false positive (FP) detection rate, and true negative (TN)
detection rate.

3.5

Cluster Tendency

A cluster tendency technique was used to help alleviate
any doubt that the power system data structure could be
accurately modeled by clustering. The Hopkins Test which
calculates a numerical index that represents whether features in a data set differ significantly from the assumption
that the features are uniformly distributed [17][12]. The index is computed by comparing the distance (di ) between
features and their nearest neighbors to the distance (si ) between uniformly generated random features and their real
nearest neighbors. The Hopkins index is:

Pn
h = Pn

si
i=1P
n
i=1

i=1 si +

di

(3)

If clusters are present in the underlying structure, then
the distance si will be greater than distance di , because the
distances from random sampled data to their real neighbors
should be greater than the distances from real data to their
real neighbors who may be clustered together. In this case
the index is high. If features are equally probable (uniformly
distributed), then di and si are similar and the index will
approach 0.5 [17]. The Hopkins index was applied to the
data sets selected for the evaluation prior to synthesizing the
data sets to increase complexity. For the most part, values
greater than 0.9 were found for each data set, which were
the average of ten iterations of the Hopkins index algorithm.

3.6

Cluster Analysis

The FCM is a widely accepted clustering model and was
presented as an improvement to the hard K-means clustering algorithm [3][24]. The FCM adopts concepts from fuzzy
set theory by assigning membership to each data point representing the degree to which the data belongs to a cluster. This membership value is inversely proportional to the
distance between data point xi and cluster centroid (prototype) cj . The prototypes are the cluster centers determined
by the FCM. The key difference between the K-means is
the fuzzy partitioning. The fuzzy membership assignment
is constructed using the membership matrix U whose values
are between [0, 1]. The assigned membership matrix values
for each cluster must sum to 1:
c
X

Uij = 1, ∀j = 1, ..., n

(4)

i=1

The FCM clustering algorithm seeks to minimize the cost
function
JF CM =

N X
C
X

2
um
ij ||xi − cj ||

(5)

i=1 j=1

Where m, commonly referred to as the fuzzifier parameter
(set to 2.0 in [3]). The fuzzifier is determined by the degree
of fuzziness in the clusters. The vector uij is the degree of
membership of xi in the cluster cj and ||xi − cj ||2 is the Euclidean distance from the states xi to the cluster prototypes
cj . We may minimize JF CM only if

Uik = (

c
X
2
||xi − ck ||2 m−1
)−1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ c; 1 ≤ k ≤ n; and
(
2)
||x
−
c
||
j
k
j=1
(6)
Pn
m
k=1 uik xk
vi = P
, 1 ≤ i ≤ c.
(7)
n
m
k=1 uik

The FCM can be summarized in two steps: 1) search for
the cluster prototypes; and 2) assign the data (states) membership to the prototypes using a distance metric such as the
Euclidean distance. This is an iterative process conducted
until the algorithm converges, i.e., the prototypes are relatively fixed with respect to prior iterations.

3.7

Fuzzy Inference System

Figure 2: Example Mamdani Fuzzy Inference System
Fuzzy inference system (FIS) is a process based on fuzzy
set theory [30] that maps inputs (e.g., features generated
from FCM membership values, prototypes, etc.) to outputs.
When used as a fuzzy classifier these outputs are classes such
as attack or normal for this application. The Mamdani fuzzy
inference system [20] process can be described by the following five steps shown in Fig. 2: 1) Fuzzify inputs by applying
input membership functions (antecedents) - this step finds
the degree to which the input belongs to the respective fuzzy
sets. 2) Use fuzzy set operators (e.g., fuzzy and, fuzzy or,
etc.) - this combines the fuzzy set inputs given the fuzzy
rules to determine each ruleâĂŹs truth value. 3) Determine
the consequence (fuzzy set) of each rule by combining the
ruleâĂŹs truth value with the output membership function.
4) Aggregate the consequence to find the output distribution. 5) Finally, find the crisp result by defuzzifying the
output distribution. This may be accomplished by computing centroid.
The fuzzy rules describe how the FIS makes a decision
given input features. The input features utilized for the
proposed method were derived from the FCM result and
a training set (data set of only normal states). The features are: a) distance between cluster prototypes and sample
space centroid; b) distance between each state and training
data centroid; c) distance-density ratio. Fuzzy rules were
developed similar to [6] relating the input variables to an
output variable for the purpose of generating an index between [0, 1]; thus, quantifying the degree by which each state
is an attack. A simple threshold of 0.7 was used to classify
states. States were classified as attack if the attack index
was greater than or equal to 0.7, otherwise the states were
classified as normal.

4.

SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

To validate the proposed anomaly-based IDS for electrical
transmission substation protection we tested the clustering
algorithms by writing software using MATLAB [21] and the

power system data set. Each data set was binary (two class)
including sensor measurements of cyber-attack events and
normal activity. The data sets included several thousand
samples for each cyber-attack scenario selected.
The FCM, K-means, and proposed IDS algorithms were
evaluated using three groups of attack scenarios. Five different data sets of the same attack type were used for each attack scenario in the experiment. Three groups were created
from this data. The first group maintained each data set in
its original form. This group, denoted simply by Attacks,
contained six attack scenarios (See Table 3). The data sets
represent attack scenarios 1 to 6. The second group was created by combining data samples collected during numerous
cyber-attack events with an attack scenario data set. The
attack samples were combined in this way to make the number of attack states much greater than the number of normal
states. This was required because each data set was primarily made up of normal states, containing approximately
10-20 percent attack states. The second group, denoted by
Mixed Attacks, contained four attack scenarios. The third
group was created by randomizing the states in each data set
from group two, as an attempt to remove large collections
of similar states in the data; thus, increasing the problem
complexity. The third group is denoted by Random (Rand)
Attacks. As mentioned previously, the first group was not
modified. This data was selected to provide a structure adhering to the constraints placed by the K-means and FCM
IDS where they would achieve the best performance. The
mixed data sets add complexity by increasing the attack
states versus normal states while adding attacks from various attack scenarios. The random attack group adds even
more complexity by randomly reordering the states in the
mixed data sets.
Table 3 illustrates the performance of the algorithms given
each attack scenario. The performance was determined by
applying the IDS algorithms to five data sets from each attack scenario. The values presented are the average over
all five data sets. The K-means and FCM IDS algorithms
perform exceptionally well given attack scenarios from group
one. These algorithms outperform the proposed IDS, achieving perfect detection of cyber-attacks given some scenarios;
however, the results are expected since the first attack group
provides ideal system behavior. The performance of these
algorithms greatly diminishes when applied to the mixed
attack and random attack group scenarios. The proposed
method overcomes the added complexity by utilizing FIS,
which allows for more information to be drawn from the
cluster results and when combined with system logs the algorithm performance is improved significantly. The K-means
and FCM IDS algorithms simply find underlying structures
in data, so although control logs, relay logs, and snort logs
were contained in each data set the algorithms failed to distinguish cyber-attacks from normal activity.
Randomly reordering samples within the data set increased
complexity for some scenarios, for others the results of the
Rand Attack scenarios mirrored the Mixed Attack scenarios.
The possibility of duplicated results between these scenarios
was expected as reordering samples should not change the
underlying data structure as long as the features remain the
same for each sample.
Our approach utilizes threshold-based classification to draw
the line between cyber-attacks and normal activity. Using
this procedure the algorithm may inaccurately classify states

Table 3: K-means, FCM, and Proposed IDS Algorithm Results.
as it attempts to apply a linear classifier to a non-linear
threshold vector. To the best of our knowledge, this step
prevented the algorithm from outperforming the K-means
and FCM IDS algorithms when applied to the first attack
group.
The overall results illustrate a vast improvement with using the proposed IDS approach over the simple FCM and
K-means IDS algorithms. The significant difference in performance demonstrates the limitations of the K-means and
FCM IDS algorithms. Furthermore, the results of the proposed IDS shows the benefits of adding intelligent techniques
such as the FIS to provide a mechanism that can be used to
improve detection.

5.

CONCLUSION

Electrical transmission substation protection systems must
address cyber-attacks along with many other contingencies
such as natural events, system faults, accidents, and operator error [11]. Sensor measurements are normally monitored by control centers housed at substations incorporating ICS/SCADA systems. The proposed IDS can support
transmission substation protection systems by alerting system operators of potential cyber-attacks. However, the IDS
should be supplemented with other cyber-attack detection
procedures to determine if potential attacks are genuine. For
instance, erroneous sensor readings may lead to true outliers
or anomalies. This behavior would be classified as a cyberattack using anomalous-based IDS techniques discussed thus
far, as most unsupervised machine learning methods used to
distinguish network states utilize similarity metrics and rely
on system models derived from normal activity; therefore,

additional methods may be necessary to waive this behavior
as a cyber-attack.
The proposed algorithm would suffice as a host-based network IDS [28] given its utilization of substation control logs,
relay logs, and snort logs. The IDS would be best placed in
electrical transmission substations. Each substation would
run its own separate IDS instance, which would be configured to monitor behavior of systems (e.g., sensors, synchrophasors, and PMUs) contained in its network. This usage model could be extended from one substation to thousands of substations, and would have a minuscule footprint
on system bandwidth and hardware, as opposed to using
a single IDS instance for multiple substations. Utilizing a
single IDS instance for multiple substations presents certain
issues, such as a single point of failure, which could leave
all associated substations without a cyber-attack detection
mechanism if the IDS fails. Another, concern utilizing a single IDS instance for multiple substations is bandwidth and
hardware requirements. For example, network traffic and
logs from each sensor and substation would be transmitted
to the IDS system; thus increasing network bandwidth requirements between these systems. Also, the computational
complexity and resources such as memory and CPU utilization would be increased with each substation, which may
lead to increased hardware requirements and costs.
In this paper, we propose a clustering approach to industrial network intrusion detection for power system applications. The approach supplemented a more complex IDS by
quantifying the degree by which an event is an attack, given
network data sets, to improve intrusion detection and minimize false alarm rates. The study shows practical value
when applied to a synthetic power system data set, and
presents a usage model showing how the IDS may be implemented in a real application.
Our experimental results highlight the issues associated
with using cluster analysis as a singular tool for anomalybased intrusion detection as the performance is degraded if
system network states do not meet certain criteria during
a cyber-attack event. Instead, clustering analysis should be
paired with techniques that allow for more intelligent results
given cluster features determined from the analysis.
Although we recommend that clustering not be used as
a singular tool for IDS, our results did find that there was
a vast improvement with using the proposed IDS over the
simple FCM and K-means IDS algorithms. In the end, if
clustering alone is used, then detection performance can be
improved by adding intelligent techniques such as FIS.
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